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ot  long  ago,  criminals  scammed 
hundreds  of  millions  of  dollars 
from  Japanese  pachinko  parlors 
without ever cracking the security 
safeguards in place. 
Instead, they worked around them.
The  Japanese  government  and  law 
enforcement  officials  designed  a  heavily 
encrypted, counterfeit-proof prepaid card for 
customers playing pachinko, a popular pinball-
like slot machine. The cards were to be used 
instead of cash in an effort to curb tax evasion. 
Rather  than  counterfeiting  these  cards, 
the  fraudsters  recycled  used  cards.  Although 
hundreds  were  arrested  in  connection  with 
the scam and thousands of phony cards were 
seized, the card sponsors’ losses exceeded $600 
million. Clearly, it is a challenge to completely 
secure a system, especially with sizable amounts 
of money at stake.
“You  can’t  anticipate  every  risk  when 
it  comes  to  payments  methods  that  are 
still  emerging,”  says  Rick  Sullivan,  a  senior 
economist  at  the  Federal  Reserve  Bank  of 
Kansas City. “Fraud can infiltrate even a heavily 
encrypted  system  in  unforeseen  ways.  But, 
confidence in these new payments products—
and  successful  consumer  adoption––depends 
on preventing misuse.”
Sullivan, along with William Roberds of 
the Atlanta Federal Reserve Bank, and Jamie 
McAndrews and Michele Braun, both of the 
New  York  Federal  Reserve  Bank,  recently 
authored a paper that focuses on risks associated 
with emerging payments methods. Their paper 
will  be  published  in  the  New  York  Federal   
Reserve Bank’s Economic Policy Review. As part 
of  its  mission,  the  Federal  Reserve  monitors 
payments  methods,  emerging  methods  and 
significant innovations.
The  authors  examined  the  risk  issues   
associated  with  new  payments  types––which 
N





















S29 FALL 2007 • TEN
in general have not been studied extensively— 
as  well  as  alterations  to  established   
payments types. 
“The  predominant  message  is  one  of 
change,” Sullivan says. 
Products, services, rules and technologies 
are all changing. So are the tools for perpetrating 
fraud and the techniques for mitigating them.
“Innovative  payment  mechanisms  are 
making transactions cheaper and easier to carry 
out,” Sullivan says. “As with more traditional 
forms  of  payment,  however,  the  ultimate 
success  of  these  inventive  arrangements  will 
depend on––among many other things––their 
ability to control risk.”
Emerging payments and risks
In  2000,  two  foreign  men  tapped  into 
Internet service providers in the United States 
to steal credit card, bank account and other 
financial information from more than 50,000 
individuals, according to the U.S. Department 
of Justice. 
The  men  then  used  that  information 
to  establish  e-mail  addresses  and  associated 
accounts  at  PayPal  and  eBay. They  acted  as 
both  the  seller  and  winning  bidder  in  the 
online  auctions,  paying  themselves  with  the 
stolen credit cards. Eventually, the FBI was able 
to lure them to the United States; they were 
sentenced to three years in prison. 
This scheme is an example of data security 
risks involved as an unprecedented number of 
new payment types are being introduced.
New  payment  methods  are  based  on 
existing payment products, with enhancements, 
innovations and rules added either to address 
new  opportunities  or  take  advantage  of 
expanding technology. But, there isn’t a precise 
definition of an “emerging payment,” or when 
a payment method becomes “established.”
Sullivan  considers  paper  checks,  pre-
authorized  automated  clearinghouse  (ACH) 
transactions,  wire  transfers,  and  credit  and 
debit cards to be established payments, while 
those that differ (technologically, contractually, 
legally  or  conceptually)  are  considered 
emerging. Examples include: general-purpose 
prepaid cards, PayPal, ACH payments initiated 
via telephone, and paper checks converted to 
ACH payments by billers and retailers. 
Sullivan  and  his  co-authors  examined 
emerging  payment  methods  that  carry 
transactions  relatively  low  in  value  and  had 
a limited number of users during their start-
up  phases.  These  payment  methods  do  not 
currently  pose  large-scale  risks  because  of 
limited  adoption  in  the  early  stage  of  their 
introduction.
“All  payment  processes  introduce  risks 
that  need  to  be  controlled,”  Sullivan  says, 
adding that fraudsters especially seem drawn 
to new technologies in an attempt to exploit 
early  weaknesses,  although  they  also  attack 
established systems.
Sullivan and his co-authors explored the 
economic  concept  behind  risks  and  propose 
a  new  framework  for  analyzing  payment 
innovation. The types of risk most relevant, but 
not limited to, emerging retail payments are:
	 •	operational risk (human or technical error 
that disrupts clearing or settlement),
	 •	fraud	risk (wrongful or criminal deception),
	 •	illicit	use	risk (includes money laundering, 
terrorist  financing,  purchase  of  illegal  goods 
and services), and
	 •	data	security	risk (form of operational risk; 
unauthorized data use).
Emerging  payments  have  special  risk 
concerns for a few reasons. They are largely 
or  wholly  electronic,  which  can  enable 
rapid  proliferation  of  fraud  and  operational 
disruptions. Additionally, these risks must be 
almost nonexistent to ensure a new payment 
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It  may  require  considerable  effort  and   
expense and definitely cooperation among all 
players to achieve. 
The  novelty  of  these  payment  methods 
implies various problems may not be anticipated 
and adequate safeguards may not be in place to 
address them.
“While not systemic (creating a domino 
effect),  some  risks  associated  with  emerging 
payments  are  widespread  and  can  disrupt 
aspects  of  general  commerce,”  Sullivan  says. 
“Failure to address these risks may jeopardize 
viability. Experience shows that all successful 
payment systems have learned to keep most of 
these risks at fairly low levels.”
Managing risks
The amount of risk management depends 
crucially  on  the  payment  system  participant 
who exerts the least effort. While this participant 
may determine the overall level of risk control, 
others with a lot at stake want a higher level 
of protection. This means some mechanism is 
necessary to give all participants the incentive 
to control risk.
“In general, market mechanisms seem to 
encourage the providers of a payment service 
to appropriately control their risks,” Sullivan 
says. “If providers fail to solve the problem, 
the  business  fails.  But  sometimes  even  this 
incentive is not enough.”
Service  providers  have  three  broad 
approaches  to  manage  various  risks:  pricing, 
which  means  the  party  bearing  the  risk  is 
compensated; insurance, or an agreement about 
who will bear the loss; and containment, which 
are activities that deter or suppress fraud. 
Pricing  and  insurance  alone  are  not 
sufficient  techniques;  containment  is  the 
dominant  means  of  controlling  risk  in 
payments, Sullivan says. Vigilantly monitoring 
participants appears to be the most effective 
avenue to control fraud. Penalties also have an 
important role in reducing risk while monetary 
fines serve as deterrents.
For example, a large bank in the Midwest 
recently  paid  $200,000  as  part  of  a  wider 
settlement for failure to perform due diligence 
on the legitimacy of customer activity.
In  2001,  two  companies’  telemarketing 
activities  appeared  to  offer  credit  cards  to 
consumers  with  poor  credit  records.  The 
companies  collected  “membership  fees”  by 
having consumers read over the phone account 
information from their checks. The information 
was converted to electronic payments to the 
companies via the bank. 
The  credit  cards  were  rarely,  if  ever, 
delivered,  and  customers  were  unknowingly 
signed up for other expensive programs. When 
customers called to complain, the companies 
used  elaborate  language  to  avoid  repayment 
or cancelation. Eventually the companies were 
shut down and prosecuted. 
The  bank  assisted  the  investigation  and 
admitted  its  risk  mitigation  failure.  For  the 
first time, the Federal Trade Commission held 
a bank responsible for the deceptive practices 
of its customer. The bank agreed to vigorously 
screen  prospective  clients  and  monitor   
customer activities.
Mitigating risk in emerging payments has 
special concerns, Sullivan says. The methods’ 
newness implies various problems may not be 
anticipated, or adequate safeguards may not be 
in place. Emerging payment methods face a 
learning curve when confronting these types of 
problems, Sullivan says. 
Participants’  privacy  is  tricky  because 
every type of payment requires the exchange of 
some information. Therefore, every successful 
payment  system  has  to  reach  a  workable 
compromise  between  collecting  users’ 
information and preventing misuse.
Competition  provides  an  important 
incentive. Consumers’ selections reflects which 
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payment  methods  best  facilitate  smooth,   
low-risk transactions. 
“Only  time  and  monitoring  will  reveal 
whether  risk  can  be  controlled  sufficiently,” 
Sullivan says. 
Lessons learned
There are several keys points for emerging 
payments methods to succeed:
• Recognize the problem: Features that add 
to the efficiency of new forms of payment––
scalability, speed, anonymity—can also enable 
rapid  proliferation  of  fraud.  As  information 
moves  more  easily  among  payment  system 
participants,  more  intensive  management  is 
needed to safeguard data flow.
•  Maintain  a  perimeter:  All  involved  in 
legitimate  payments  (originators,  receivers, 
banks,  payment  processors  and  networks) 
operate  behind  a  protective  barricade  of 
security. Wrongdoers need to be kept out.
• Trust the marketplace, but not blindly: 
New  payments  products  are  immediately 
susceptible  to  operational,  fraud  and  data 
security risks. Risk management responds to 
market  incentives,  though  experience  shows 
there’s  a  learning  curve.  At  the  same  time, 
well-designed  laws  and  regulations  can  help 
policymakers  ensure  the  “public  good”  of 
confidence in the overall payment system. 
“New  payments  products  are  likely 
exposed  to  fairly  high  levels  of  operational, 
fraud and reputation risk,” Sullivan says. “But, 
if a payment provider can address the problem 
quickly and effectively, it can stay in business. 
Containment  is  the  dominant  method  to 
thwart these threats.”
Generally,  market  mechanisms  appear 
to  encourage  providers  to  mitigate  risks 
appropriately. Most providers, especially those 
in the private sector, have tools and incentives 
to manage many of these risks in part because 
they retain the option to exclude any party that 
fails  to  comply  with  a  network’s  safeguards.   
PayPal,  for  example,  has  learned  through   
experience  the  techniques  and  tools  to   
recognize  risk  and  quickly  correct  it.     
 
The  company  manages  fraud  by  de-
nying  or  restricting  access  and  blocking   
those who don’t comply with its rules. Its “veri-
fied” member program protects PayPal and cre-
ates a product that’s marketed to customers.
“With emerging payments, the problems, 
risks and gaps in processes can be addressed,” 
Sullivan  says,  “only  if  the  providers  and  the 
participants apply constant vigilance as more 
and more payments methods emerge during 
this exciting time for the industry.” 
rIck  SullIvAn,  a  senior  economist  at  the   
Federal reserve bank of kansas city, partnered   
with other Federal reserve colleagues to author a 
paper on risks associated with emerging payments 
methods. he shares their findings with peers.
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